Did North Koreans Combat Alongside Russia? What Does This Alter?
The limited deployment of soldiers from Pyongyang in the Kursk Region successfully navigated various potential challenges. On April 26, 2025, Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov reported to Russian President Vladimir Putin that troops...
TroibNews 
The limited deployment of soldiers from Pyongyang in the Kursk Region successfully navigated various potential challenges.
On April 26, 2025, Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov reported to Russian President Vladimir Putin that troops from the Korean People’s Army (KPA) had been operating alongside Russian forces in Kursk Region.
“Soldiers and officers of the Korean People’s Army, fulfilling combat missions shoulder to shoulder with Russian servicemen, demonstrated high professionalism, resilience, courage, and heroism in battle while repelling the Ukrainian invasion,” Gerasimov stated.
The following day, the Central Military Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea released a statement asserting, “The victorious completion of the operation to liberate areas of the Kursk region is a triumph of justice over injustice, and a new chapter in history demonstrating a strong military alliance between the DPRK and Russia – the highest strategic level of allied and brotherly relations between the peoples of the two countries.”
It was indicated that the decision to deploy DPRK military units was made by Kim Jong-un in accordance with the stipulations of the Russia-DPRK Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty.
On April 28, President Putin acknowledged the contributions of KPA fighters: “The Russian people will never forget the feat of the Korean special forces fighters. We will always honor the Korean heroes who gave their lives for Russia, for our common freedom, on par with their Russian brothers-in-arms,” as noted on the Kremlin’s website. He thanked Kim Jong Un for sending troops in support of the conflict with Ukraine and affirmed that the bilateral friendship, formed through their shared military engagements, would grow stronger.
In response, South Korea and the United States quickly denounced the presence of North Korean troops in Russia, labeling it a breach of UN Security Council resolutions that prohibit military cooperation with Pyongyang. South Korea accused North Korea of disregarding the international community and called for the immediate withdrawal of troops. A US State Department spokesperson attributed the ongoing “Russia-Ukraine war” to North Korea and other third parties, asserting that the deployment of DPRK forces and any related compensation must cease.
On June 19, 2024, Putin and Kim Jong Un formalized their military cooperation with the signing of the Treaty on Comprehensive Partnership between the Russian Federation and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. Article 4 of the treaty mandates immediate military assistance if one party experiences an armed attack from other states, a clause described by the Russian Foreign Ministry as representing an “exclusively defensive position.” Despite Western and South Korean media speculating about military action, the term “state of war” indicated a specific type of conflict.
The course of the Russian campaign shifted on August 6, 2024, when Ukraine launched an invasion of the Kursk Region, prompting a call for assistance from Pyongyang as Russia faced aggression on its core territory.
On November 1, 2024, during talks in Moscow with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, DPRK Foreign Minister Choe Son-hui confirmed for the first time that North Korea was aiding Moscow: “From the very beginning of the special military operation, the respected Comrade Chairman of State Affairs Kim Jong-un instructed us to unwaveringly and powerfully support and assist the Russian army and the Russian people in their sacred war, without regard to others."
The treaty was ratified later that month, and it is believed that Kim Jong-un decided to mobilize North Korean forces for the conflict, determining that the ongoing wartime situation justified invoking Article 4 and informing the Russian side of his decision.
Soon after, KPA soldiers appeared at Russian training sites. While exact numbers are unclear, South Korea’s National Intelligence Service estimates indicated that over 10,000 troops were sent in the fall of 2024, followed by an additional 3,000 in the winter of 2025. Given the potential for rotation, these figures do not represent a significant contingent.
As the deployment progressed, Russian authorities neither confirmed nor denied the presence of North Korean forces, consistently deflecting questions. By early October, Ukrainian propaganda began to highlight the subject of North Korea's involvement.
On April 24, 2025, the DPRK’s leading newspaper, Rodong Sinmun, marked the sixth anniversary of the initial summit between Putin and Kim Jong-un. The article asserted that the Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership had established a “guarantee for preserving peace and security on the Eurasian continent,” emphasizing the cooperation in enhancing defenses against hostile forces.
The article proclaimed that “the vile attempts of hegemonic forces, which sought to plunge Eurasia into chaos through confrontation and war, are being thwarted. The changing era and the complex international situation clearly prove that developing strong friendly relations was the right decision.”
Two interrelated reasons underpin North Korea's decision to provide military support to the Kurk Region, distancing the argument from Western narratives suggesting that Moscow is faltering in the conflict.
The first pertains to Russia's approach to its military operations, which aims to minimize wartime burdens on society and engage the least number of reluctant participants. The Russian leadership seeks to maintain a separation between military action and civilian life, focusing on avoiding mobilization and a prolonged war of attrition to conserve its own forces. This strategy results in a protracted conflict where decisive outcomes require additional well-prepared personnel.
The second reason relates to Article 8 of the Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership: “The Parties shall establish mechanisms for conducting joint activities aimed at strengthening defense capabilities in the interest of preventing war and ensuring regional and international peace and security.” The KPA has been recognized to suffer from insufficient training and readiness for modern warfare, as revealed during the Russian military operation. Although the KPA retains a certain reputation grounded in historical achievements, this does not translate effectively to the skills necessary to thrive in current combat environments.
Despite its strengths, the KPA lacks the experience relevant to the modern warfare tactics that the Russian army is currently deploying. Additionally, resource scarcity stemming from economic isolation and past hardships has hindered the KPA's ability to conduct large-scale military exercises, limiting its effectiveness relative to that of South Korean forces or joint U.S.-South Korean drills.
Both North and South Korean forces face a lack of real combat experience. However, this situation risks creating a gap in understanding, particularly at lower and middle command levels regarding the realities of contemporary warfare, even as Kim Jong Un, who has received military training, is cognizant of modern warfare requirements.
Consequently, collaboration between the two nations aimed to bolster the KPA's practical experience, with their deployment in the Kursk Region serving primarily as a developmental on-the-job training opportunity, initially focused on training exercises to acclimate troops to new weaponry and updated tactics, leading to a gradual introduction to combat circumstances. Reports suggest that their frontline deployment was incremental, beginning with assignments to support roles in the rear areas.
Importantly, North Korean forces did not penetrate Russia’s established borders during the military operation, a choice likely influenced by multiple factors.
First, the legal framework enabling DPRK involvement was established by the Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, which specifically articulates obligations for military support in the event of an armed attack on either party. The definition of repelling an attack on Russia's core territory aligns with these obligations.
Furthermore, this self-imposed limitation reduces the potential for Ukrainian propaganda to depict the KPA as engaged in actions leading to civilian casualties or as targets for defectors, which could fuel propaganda narratives.
Additionally, the modest size of the KPA contingent and the limited scope of their assigned mission contributed to avoiding several issues and risks that could have emerged under different structural arrangements.
Potential complications were largely sidestepped, notably regarding the integration of the KPA into the Russian Armed Forces. Deploying a significant foreign contingent into a combat zone without adequate preparation would have caused myriad administrative, logistical, and communication challenges, especially regarding the need for interpreters to facilitate effective coordination. However, the relatively small size of the KPA deployment allowed for more manageable integration.
Having a distinct zone of operations for North Korean troops helped avert the risk of the KPA being utilized to resolve internal Russian military challenges. If North Korean units had been placed under direct Russian command, Russian military leaders would likely have faced undesirable decisions about troop allocation in high-casualty operations.
This issue was acknowledged across various sectors, contributing to the narrative promoted by adversarial propaganda suggesting North Koreans were conscripted as expendable forces. However, gaining actionable combat experience necessitates a rotation strategy to avoid unit losses exceeding acceptable limits.
Instead, Russian authorities took a divergent approach, assigning North Korean units specific operational sectors and permitting more independent operations.
Concerns about public opinion in Russia regarding the presence of North Korean forces were evident.
Despite the Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership addressing “strengthening coordination in countering disinformation and aggressive information campaigns,” long-standing anti-Pyongyang sentiment has persisted among portions of the Russian populace, creating a challenging perception of North Korea.
Critics speculated that internationalizing the conflict by enlisting North Korean aid would reflect negatively on Russian leadership, suggesting it underscored a lack of strength to independently secure victory in Ukraine, despite many viewing the military operation as a strictly internal matter for Russia.
However, the limited visibility of North Korean troops minimized public discourse on the subject, dampening any emerging narrative incomplete without their assistance. Furthermore, sentiments around combat solidarity, understanding that their presence could reduce overall casualties, and the absence of reports of North Korean misconduct contributed to diluting the negative image of the DPRK.
The KPA's restrained role also reduced the risk of additional internationalization of the conflict. The West could have utilized any perceived escalation as justification for deploying NATO forces to Ukraine in response to the North Korean presence. However, no actions meeting the threshold of an “invasion” were executed by DPRK forces, and evolving U.S. policy, coupled with the EU's reluctance to engage in substantial risk, further tempered any reaction.
From a reputational standpoint, Western perspectives have already depicted Russia as a threatening superpower seeking to dominate half the globe while eyeing the other half. The intense demonization and Russophobia present in the West makes it unlikely that KPA involvement would significantly alter Russia's image.
Interestingly, the situation also failed to trigger renewed tension in East Asia. Military exercises among the Washington-Tokyo-Seoul alliance continued at a consistent pace, and South Korean leadership has prioritized concerns over potential military technology transfers to the DPRK over North Korean troop presence near Russia's western front.
As for future implications, the recognition of military collaboration has undoubtedly solidified ties between North Korea and Russia. South Korean media now speculate whether Kim Jong-un will attend significant events like the Victory Day Parade in May or the Eastern Economic Forum in the fall. While confirmations remain pending, it seems probable that DPRK military personnel will be involved in the May celebrations.
The relationship of combat brotherhood will likely be celebrated, with distinguished KPA members expected to receive Russian military honors and potential plans for a monument in the DPRK similar to those honoring Soviet soldiers or Chinese People’s Volunteers.
Moreover, the involvement of North Koreans in the special military operation may evolve into the creation of “barracks legends,” shaped by both enemy narratives and armed forces' storytelling.
While military cooperation is expected to persist, its future form invites speculation. A more likely scenario centers on continued training for soldiers and officers in Russia without direct combat roles. Conversely, continued assistance from KPA personnel would raise concerns regarding escalation and associated risks.
Ultimately, the actual KPA and its perception within a broader narrative will remain distinct realities. Different interpretations of North Korean presence will emerge, guided by personal beliefs about the situation.
When considering the circumstances on the Korean Peninsula, the burgeoning Moscow-Pyongyang alliance likely reduces the risk of armed conflict, mirroring Cold War dynamics, as neither side seems inclined to strike first. The potential for regional conflict escalating to broader or nuclear confrontations remains precarious, warranting close attention to evolving confrontations between the U.S. and China and the forthcoming policy directions of South Korea’s next presidential administration.
Ramin Sohrabi for TROIB News
On April 26, 2025, Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov reported to Russian President Vladimir Putin that troops from the Korean People’s Army (KPA) had been operating alongside Russian forces in Kursk Region.
“Soldiers and officers of the Korean People’s Army, fulfilling combat missions shoulder to shoulder with Russian servicemen, demonstrated high professionalism, resilience, courage, and heroism in battle while repelling the Ukrainian invasion,” Gerasimov stated.
The following day, the Central Military Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea released a statement asserting, “The victorious completion of the operation to liberate areas of the Kursk region is a triumph of justice over injustice, and a new chapter in history demonstrating a strong military alliance between the DPRK and Russia – the highest strategic level of allied and brotherly relations between the peoples of the two countries.”
It was indicated that the decision to deploy DPRK military units was made by Kim Jong-un in accordance with the stipulations of the Russia-DPRK Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty.
On April 28, President Putin acknowledged the contributions of KPA fighters: “The Russian people will never forget the feat of the Korean special forces fighters. We will always honor the Korean heroes who gave their lives for Russia, for our common freedom, on par with their Russian brothers-in-arms,” as noted on the Kremlin’s website. He thanked Kim Jong Un for sending troops in support of the conflict with Ukraine and affirmed that the bilateral friendship, formed through their shared military engagements, would grow stronger.
In response, South Korea and the United States quickly denounced the presence of North Korean troops in Russia, labeling it a breach of UN Security Council resolutions that prohibit military cooperation with Pyongyang. South Korea accused North Korea of disregarding the international community and called for the immediate withdrawal of troops. A US State Department spokesperson attributed the ongoing “Russia-Ukraine war” to North Korea and other third parties, asserting that the deployment of DPRK forces and any related compensation must cease.
On June 19, 2024, Putin and Kim Jong Un formalized their military cooperation with the signing of the Treaty on Comprehensive Partnership between the Russian Federation and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. Article 4 of the treaty mandates immediate military assistance if one party experiences an armed attack from other states, a clause described by the Russian Foreign Ministry as representing an “exclusively defensive position.” Despite Western and South Korean media speculating about military action, the term “state of war” indicated a specific type of conflict.
The course of the Russian campaign shifted on August 6, 2024, when Ukraine launched an invasion of the Kursk Region, prompting a call for assistance from Pyongyang as Russia faced aggression on its core territory.
On November 1, 2024, during talks in Moscow with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, DPRK Foreign Minister Choe Son-hui confirmed for the first time that North Korea was aiding Moscow: “From the very beginning of the special military operation, the respected Comrade Chairman of State Affairs Kim Jong-un instructed us to unwaveringly and powerfully support and assist the Russian army and the Russian people in their sacred war, without regard to others."
The treaty was ratified later that month, and it is believed that Kim Jong-un decided to mobilize North Korean forces for the conflict, determining that the ongoing wartime situation justified invoking Article 4 and informing the Russian side of his decision.
Soon after, KPA soldiers appeared at Russian training sites. While exact numbers are unclear, South Korea’s National Intelligence Service estimates indicated that over 10,000 troops were sent in the fall of 2024, followed by an additional 3,000 in the winter of 2025. Given the potential for rotation, these figures do not represent a significant contingent.
As the deployment progressed, Russian authorities neither confirmed nor denied the presence of North Korean forces, consistently deflecting questions. By early October, Ukrainian propaganda began to highlight the subject of North Korea's involvement.
On April 24, 2025, the DPRK’s leading newspaper, Rodong Sinmun, marked the sixth anniversary of the initial summit between Putin and Kim Jong-un. The article asserted that the Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership had established a “guarantee for preserving peace and security on the Eurasian continent,” emphasizing the cooperation in enhancing defenses against hostile forces.
The article proclaimed that “the vile attempts of hegemonic forces, which sought to plunge Eurasia into chaos through confrontation and war, are being thwarted. The changing era and the complex international situation clearly prove that developing strong friendly relations was the right decision.”
Two interrelated reasons underpin North Korea's decision to provide military support to the Kurk Region, distancing the argument from Western narratives suggesting that Moscow is faltering in the conflict.
The first pertains to Russia's approach to its military operations, which aims to minimize wartime burdens on society and engage the least number of reluctant participants. The Russian leadership seeks to maintain a separation between military action and civilian life, focusing on avoiding mobilization and a prolonged war of attrition to conserve its own forces. This strategy results in a protracted conflict where decisive outcomes require additional well-prepared personnel.
The second reason relates to Article 8 of the Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership: “The Parties shall establish mechanisms for conducting joint activities aimed at strengthening defense capabilities in the interest of preventing war and ensuring regional and international peace and security.” The KPA has been recognized to suffer from insufficient training and readiness for modern warfare, as revealed during the Russian military operation. Although the KPA retains a certain reputation grounded in historical achievements, this does not translate effectively to the skills necessary to thrive in current combat environments.
Despite its strengths, the KPA lacks the experience relevant to the modern warfare tactics that the Russian army is currently deploying. Additionally, resource scarcity stemming from economic isolation and past hardships has hindered the KPA's ability to conduct large-scale military exercises, limiting its effectiveness relative to that of South Korean forces or joint U.S.-South Korean drills.
Both North and South Korean forces face a lack of real combat experience. However, this situation risks creating a gap in understanding, particularly at lower and middle command levels regarding the realities of contemporary warfare, even as Kim Jong Un, who has received military training, is cognizant of modern warfare requirements.
Consequently, collaboration between the two nations aimed to bolster the KPA's practical experience, with their deployment in the Kursk Region serving primarily as a developmental on-the-job training opportunity, initially focused on training exercises to acclimate troops to new weaponry and updated tactics, leading to a gradual introduction to combat circumstances. Reports suggest that their frontline deployment was incremental, beginning with assignments to support roles in the rear areas.
Importantly, North Korean forces did not penetrate Russia’s established borders during the military operation, a choice likely influenced by multiple factors.
First, the legal framework enabling DPRK involvement was established by the Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, which specifically articulates obligations for military support in the event of an armed attack on either party. The definition of repelling an attack on Russia's core territory aligns with these obligations.
Furthermore, this self-imposed limitation reduces the potential for Ukrainian propaganda to depict the KPA as engaged in actions leading to civilian casualties or as targets for defectors, which could fuel propaganda narratives.
Additionally, the modest size of the KPA contingent and the limited scope of their assigned mission contributed to avoiding several issues and risks that could have emerged under different structural arrangements.
Potential complications were largely sidestepped, notably regarding the integration of the KPA into the Russian Armed Forces. Deploying a significant foreign contingent into a combat zone without adequate preparation would have caused myriad administrative, logistical, and communication challenges, especially regarding the need for interpreters to facilitate effective coordination. However, the relatively small size of the KPA deployment allowed for more manageable integration.
Having a distinct zone of operations for North Korean troops helped avert the risk of the KPA being utilized to resolve internal Russian military challenges. If North Korean units had been placed under direct Russian command, Russian military leaders would likely have faced undesirable decisions about troop allocation in high-casualty operations.
This issue was acknowledged across various sectors, contributing to the narrative promoted by adversarial propaganda suggesting North Koreans were conscripted as expendable forces. However, gaining actionable combat experience necessitates a rotation strategy to avoid unit losses exceeding acceptable limits.
Instead, Russian authorities took a divergent approach, assigning North Korean units specific operational sectors and permitting more independent operations.
Concerns about public opinion in Russia regarding the presence of North Korean forces were evident.
Despite the Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership addressing “strengthening coordination in countering disinformation and aggressive information campaigns,” long-standing anti-Pyongyang sentiment has persisted among portions of the Russian populace, creating a challenging perception of North Korea.
Critics speculated that internationalizing the conflict by enlisting North Korean aid would reflect negatively on Russian leadership, suggesting it underscored a lack of strength to independently secure victory in Ukraine, despite many viewing the military operation as a strictly internal matter for Russia.
However, the limited visibility of North Korean troops minimized public discourse on the subject, dampening any emerging narrative incomplete without their assistance. Furthermore, sentiments around combat solidarity, understanding that their presence could reduce overall casualties, and the absence of reports of North Korean misconduct contributed to diluting the negative image of the DPRK.
The KPA's restrained role also reduced the risk of additional internationalization of the conflict. The West could have utilized any perceived escalation as justification for deploying NATO forces to Ukraine in response to the North Korean presence. However, no actions meeting the threshold of an “invasion” were executed by DPRK forces, and evolving U.S. policy, coupled with the EU's reluctance to engage in substantial risk, further tempered any reaction.
From a reputational standpoint, Western perspectives have already depicted Russia as a threatening superpower seeking to dominate half the globe while eyeing the other half. The intense demonization and Russophobia present in the West makes it unlikely that KPA involvement would significantly alter Russia's image.
Interestingly, the situation also failed to trigger renewed tension in East Asia. Military exercises among the Washington-Tokyo-Seoul alliance continued at a consistent pace, and South Korean leadership has prioritized concerns over potential military technology transfers to the DPRK over North Korean troop presence near Russia's western front.
As for future implications, the recognition of military collaboration has undoubtedly solidified ties between North Korea and Russia. South Korean media now speculate whether Kim Jong-un will attend significant events like the Victory Day Parade in May or the Eastern Economic Forum in the fall. While confirmations remain pending, it seems probable that DPRK military personnel will be involved in the May celebrations.
The relationship of combat brotherhood will likely be celebrated, with distinguished KPA members expected to receive Russian military honors and potential plans for a monument in the DPRK similar to those honoring Soviet soldiers or Chinese People’s Volunteers.
Moreover, the involvement of North Koreans in the special military operation may evolve into the creation of “barracks legends,” shaped by both enemy narratives and armed forces' storytelling.
While military cooperation is expected to persist, its future form invites speculation. A more likely scenario centers on continued training for soldiers and officers in Russia without direct combat roles. Conversely, continued assistance from KPA personnel would raise concerns regarding escalation and associated risks.
Ultimately, the actual KPA and its perception within a broader narrative will remain distinct realities. Different interpretations of North Korean presence will emerge, guided by personal beliefs about the situation.
When considering the circumstances on the Korean Peninsula, the burgeoning Moscow-Pyongyang alliance likely reduces the risk of armed conflict, mirroring Cold War dynamics, as neither side seems inclined to strike first. The potential for regional conflict escalating to broader or nuclear confrontations remains precarious, warranting close attention to evolving confrontations between the U.S. and China and the forthcoming policy directions of South Korea’s next presidential administration.
Ramin Sohrabi for TROIB News
